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Abstract 
This paper examines the dynamics of the development of Euro-Islam as a discourse which 
offers a modern interpretation of Islam that fits with European context. It investigates how 
Europe-wide Muslim umbrella organisations promote Euro-Islam discourse while at the same 
time gain position to represent European Muslims at the European level by mobilising the 
discourse. Drawing from constructivist literature, this paper argues that Tariq Ramadan’s 
version of Euro-Islam has been in the stage of socialisation characterised by (1) the existence 
of network of organisational platforms such as Federation of Islamic Organisation in Europe 
(FIOE) and Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations (FEMYSO), (2) 
the support from supranational actors such as European Parliament and European 
Commission, and (3) the efforts to codify the discourse through the creation of the Muslims 
of Europe Charter. However, given the lack of organisational infrastructure to diffuse the 
discourse due to the diverse nature of Muslim communities in Europe, further internalisation 
of the discourse has been hindered. Additionally, the connection between Euro-Islam’s 
organisational platforms with Islamist movement has made the discourse on Euro-Islam 
being perceived as a camouflage for Islamist agenda. Thus, at this stage, Euro-Islam has 
become “empty signifier” that are open to continual contestation which serves Muslim 
umbrella organisations with speaker position to lobby at the European level. 
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Introduction 
During the past two decades, Islam has become a focus of immigration debate in Western 
Europe (Yildiz and Verkuyten 2012). The steady increase in the Muslim population has 
become a new conundrum in Europe. The problem stems from the issue of identity and the 
existence of Muslim immigrants who are seemingly reluctant to integrate into broader 
European society. Furthermore, the economic and social discrimination perceived by 
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Muslims in Europe has increased the difficulty they face in terms of integration (Zick et al. 
2008). While some right-wing politicians would blame the incompatibility between Islamic 
and western values (Deliso 2007; Parekh 2006), there is a growing opinion stating that the 
core problem of the tensions between Muslims and Europeans leading to the identity crisis 
among Muslim immigrants in Europe is the lack of efforts to create a new atmosphere that 
allows Islamic teaching to be compatible with European values (Adida et al. 2010; 
Kastoryano 2004). This perceived incompatibility creates a further identity barrier among 
European Muslims. 
In order to overcome the issue, at the discourse level, there have been some efforts by 
Muslim scholars in Europe to nurture a new idea, generally called Euro-Islam, which could 
enable Muslims to integrate Islamic teaching with European values (AlSayyad and Castells 
2002; Nielsen 2007). In a nutshell, Euro-Islam is a variant of a liberal understanding of Islam 
that can be accepted by both Muslim and European society. The idea aims to reform Islamic 
teaching so that it can accommodate principles of European values such as secularity and 
individualism (Tibi 2008). There are two main European Muslim scholars that are devoted to 
developing Euro-Islam: Bassam Tibi and Tariq Ramadan. Despite their fundamental 
differences in conceptualising Euro-Islam (Arfi 2010), both strands have a common objective 
of reforming Islamic teaching to accommodate European values. 
Though this is still continuously debated and criticised within the academic discourse, in 
practice, Euro-Islam has been promoted by Muslim organisations in Europe (Bowen 2004; 
Şen 2008). While Euro-Islam might be the answer to the problems Muslims face in Europe, 
the question raised is to what extent has the Euro-Islam been promoted and implemented? In 
general, most of the literature on integration of Islam in Europe tends to investigate this 
question by focusing on the dynamics between Muslim organisations and governments and 
other actors at a national level (Arkilic 2015; Kroissenbrunner 2003; Rosenow-Williams 
2014b; Yukleyen 2009). There is a dearth of studies analysing the development of Euro-Islam 
from academic discourse to the mobilisation of the idea by Muslim organisations at the 
European level. 
In order to fill the gap outlined above, this paper examines this question by investigating how 
Europe-wide Muslim organisations promote Euro-Islam discourse while at the same time 
gain position to represent European Muslims at the European level by mobilising the 
discourse. This paper focuses on the Federation of Islamic Organisation in Europe (FIOE) 
and Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations (FEMYSO) as the most 
successful transnational Muslim umbrella organisations in Europe in enhancing Euro-Islam 
discourse into a broader public debate. Indeed, there are several studies focusing on these 
organisations; however, majority of them limit their analysis by contextualising these 
umbrella organisations as part of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Europe which can be 
considered as an Islamist movement (Maréchal 2008a; Rubin 2010). This paper instead 
frames FIOE and FEMYSO as organisational platforms for promotion of Euro-Islam into a 
broader European public sphere. Firstly, the organisations have the objective of promoting 
Euro-Islam among European Muslims. Secondly, both have an organisational networks 
covering almost all Western European countries. Most importantly, FIOE and FEMYSO 
focus on the European level as their playing field in advocating the idea of Euro-Islam among 
both European Muslims and European policy makers. 
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Drawing heavily from the life cycle of norms theory developed by Finnemore and Sikkink 
(1998), this paper argues that Tariq Ramadan’s version of Euro-Islam as a proposed 
alternative understanding of Islam for European Muslims has been in the stage of 
socialisation characterised by the existence of network of organisational platforms advocating 
Euro-Islam, the support from the European Union (EU) institutions such as European 
Parliament and European Commission, and the efforts to codify the idea of Euro-Islam 
through the signature of the Muslims of Europe Charter by nearly 400 Muslim organisations 
in Europe. However, given the lack of organisational infrastructure to diffuse the idea due to 
the diverse nature of Muslim communities in Europe, further internalisation of the idea 
among Muslim communities throughout Europe has been hindered. Besides, the connections 
between the Euro-Islam’s organisational platforms with Islamist movement namely Muslim 
Brotherhood have made the idea of Euro-Islam being perceived as a camouflage for Islamist 
agenda. Thus, in this stage, Euro-Islam has become “empty signifier” that are open to 
continual contestation which provides Muslim umbrella organisations such as FIOE and 
FEMYSO with speaker position to lobby at European level. 
This paper is organised as follows: The first section lays out the theoretical framework 
informed by constructivist approach in understanding the emergence of Euro-Islam in 
Europe. It puts forwards several theoretical insights that may contribute towards the 
advancement of literature on idea diffusion. The second section critically discusses the 
academic debate on the two strands of Euro-Islam discourse developed by Bassam Tibi and 
Tariq Ramadhan, while in the third section, the paper briefly examines how organisational 
platforms help in disseminating the discourse on Euro-Islam into a broader European public 
sphere. The fourth section investigates how the discourse on Euro-Islam promoted by FIOE 
and FEMYSO has been strategically supported by the EU in their fight against Islamic home-
grown radicalism in Europe given that both are being seen as the most organised Muslim 
umbrella organisations at the European level. Finally, the last section assesses the limits of 
Euro-Islam as a discourse due to the criticism of credibility of both the norm entrepreneur 
and the organisational platforms. 
 
Understanding Euro-Islam Through Constructivist Lens 
Euro-Islam is a concept proposed by several European Muslim scholars in response to the 
growing Muslim communities in Europe (AlSayyad and Castells 2002; Karić 2002). While in 
the 1960s and 1970s, the Muslim communities in Europe mainly consisted of first-generation 
immigrants, the majority of Muslims in Europe are now mainly second or third generation, 
meaning they live and grew up with European cultures and values (Crul and Vermeulen 
2003). Given this condition, Muslim communities in Europe are faced with the challenge of 
preserving their religious identity and cultural practices while at the same time integrating 
with a broader European society (Franz 2007). The current trend on radicalisation among 
minorities in European Muslim youths who fall into extremist ideology is evidence for the 
failure to overcome this challenge within the third generation of Muslims in Europe 
(Murshed and Pavan 2011; O’duffy 2008). The primary idea of Euro-Islam is to bridge the 
identity of being Muslim and European, and thus reduce the feeling of marginalisation as 
well as deprivation caused by not being included in the broader society. Despite being 
developed in the mid-1990s and early 2000s, Euro-Islam gained momentum after 9/11 as 
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there was a need for a strong counter-narrative to combat radicalisation among Muslim 
communities during the War on Terror orchestrated by George W. Bush. Given this situation, 
the idea of Euro-Islam became interesting as a solution able to provide a more moderate 
version of Islamic teaching and has since been promoted by many Muslim organisations in 
Europe (Mandaville 2009). 
As an idea that has been pursued and promoted and is expected to be a set of values for 
Muslim in Europe, it is interesting to study Euro-Islam through the constructivist perspective, 
which focuses on diffusion of idea into practice. One of the most robust frameworks on 
diffusion of idea is the life cycle norm theory proposed by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). 
Indeed, several frameworks have been used in analysing Euro-Islam (Yildiz and Verkuyten 
2012). For instance, in his paper, Arfi (2010) critically analyses the formation of Euro-Islam 
among Muslim communities by applying a postmodern deconstructive approach. However, 
his analysis narrowly focuses on the formation of the concept at the discursive level without 
trying to assess to what extent the idea has been transformed into practice. 
There are advantages in using life cycle of norms in analysing the emergence of Euro-Islam 
as a proposed set of values advocated by Muslim organisations in Europe. Firstly, by utilising 
life cycle of norms theory, we can analyse the contestation of the Euro-Islam at the discourse 
level when the idea was firstly incepted and contested. Secondly, it allows us to examine to 
dynamics through which the idea of Euro-Islam at the discourse level has been promoted by 
Muslim organisations and has generated responses from policy actors. Lastly, life cycle of 
norms can capture the interactions among actors in responding to the emergence of Euro-
Islam (Table 1). 
 
 
 
 
The life cycle of norms provides an excellent framework to examine to what extent the 
concept of Euro-Islam is able to be promoted. According to the theory, in the early stage of 
idea emergence, the idea emerges through an intellectual and academic debate initiated by 
norm entrepreneurs whose ideas will gradually be disseminated into a public sphere 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). However, norm entrepreneurs are not the only factor that 
enables an idea to transform into a more concrete activity; there is a need for the idea 
produced by norm entrepreneurs to be supported by organisational platforms which are 
capable of manifesting discursive ideas as practical ideas. These organisational platforms are 
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significant actors in enhancing the ideas within the public sphere. Without organisational 
platforms, the idea will simply remain at the discursive level. In this first phase when the idea 
emerged, norm entrepreneurs and organisational platforms are critical actors in disseminating 
the idea to the broader public discourse. According to the theory, the motive of these actors is 
mainly an ideational commitment in which the actors believe that the idea might be good for 
society in general. While life cycle of norms assumes that organisational platform efforts to 
promote ideas produced by norm entrepreneur is driven primarily by their ideational 
commitment, this paper further claim that there is also possibility that their efforts in 
promoting particular ideas have enhanced their credibility to represent a broader community 
that benefitted from the ideas. Thus, promoting particular ideas provides them with a position 
as a partner of the targeted actors. This claim could be an incremental contribution towards 
literature of ideas diffusion within constructivist literature particularly on how organisational 
platforms gain an opportunity by promoting certain ideas. 
In the second phase when the idea is being largely accepted by broader audience, the main 
actors in the process are states, international organisations and the network of entrepreneurs. 
In this phase, the norm has been socialised by socialising actors so that the targeted actors 
mainly states are motivated to support the new idea. The main strategy for socialising actors 
in pursuing their agenda is socialisation and institutionalisation in the form of persuasion and 
engagement aiming to raise public awareness regarding the existence of the idea (Payne 
2001). 
While Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 902) mainly focus on states as targeted actors and 
international organisations, states and the network of entrepreneurs as socialising actors, in 
our case, the socialising actors are primarily a network of organisational platforms who 
become agents of socialisation through their active involvement in policy lobbying and 
prescription. Furthermore, the targeted actor is a supranational institution in the EU such as 
European Parliament and European Commission. While the motive for targeted actors to 
involve themselves in the adoption of the ideas might vary, it is most often to enhance their 
legitimacy, reputation or esteem. This paper proposes the pursuit of security interest through 
the adoption of the idea that may also be a motive for targeted actors to support particular 
emerging idea. However, this motivation would not make the idea to be further internalised. 
This is because the idea has not fully socialised; rather, it is only resonated with the short-
term interest of targeted actor. 
The last phase of life cycle of norms is the internalisation process. During this stage, the idea 
is internalised in the form of a policy or regulation enacted by both states and supranational 
organisations as policy actors. The motive of targeted actors to internalise the idea is to seek 
conformity. In this phase, the idea “become so widely accepted that they are internalised by 
actors and achieve a taken-for granted quality that makes conformance almost automatic” 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: p.904). 
While the states and international organisations might theoretically play a greater role in 
socialising and institutionalising norms, there is a greater possibility that network of 
organisational platforms can play a more significant role in socialising the targeted actors to 
adopt a particular idea and at the same time gain a prominent position in its relations with 
targeted actors. In order to substantiate this claim, the next section provides an analysis of the 
dynamic interaction between socialising and targeted actors in the process of nurturing the 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12134-017-0514-4  
idea of Euro-Islam in Europe. However, through prior observations of the dynamics, the 
paper firstly addresses the contestation of the idea of Euro-Islam among norm entrepreneurs, 
namely the strand of Euro-Islam proposed by Bassam Tibi and Tariq Ramadan. 
 
The Emergence of Euro-Islam 
In the early process of idea diffusion, the idea should be put forward by actors; these initial 
actors that call attention to particular issues that need to be addressed are called norm 
entrepreneurs. Without the presence of norm entrepreneurs, it is difficult for the idea to be 
significantly meaningful to attract support (Elgström 2000; Saurugger 2010). Norm 
entrepreneurs thus become very important in the formation of the norm due to their 
significant role in creating public attention. The strategy by which norm entrepreneurs spread 
the idea is usually the establishment of discourse within the public debate (Payne 2001). 
In the case of Euro-Islam, two main norm entrepreneurs conceptualised the idea at the 
discursive level through their intellectual works, namely Bassam Tibi and Tariq Ramadan 
(Arfi 2010). Both are not only actively conceptualising Euro-Islam but are also actively 
involved in spreading their ideas regarding the need for reform within Islamic teaching to 
align it with European values. Despite their focus on the same issues, their conceptualisations 
of Euro-Islam are fundamentally different. While Bassam Tibi’s approach is a more radical 
reform of Islamic teaching in his conceptualisation of Euro-Islam, Tariq Ramadhan’s 
approach leans toward a progressive reform in interpreting Islamic teaching in the European 
context. 
Bassam Tibi, a scholar from Germany, claimed to be the first to use Euro-Islam as a concept. 
He expressed this term in 1992 when the French government tried to abandon the 
assimilation approach and use an integration approach in its effort to integrate the Muslim 
community into broader French society (Al-Azmeh and Fokas 2007). According to Tibi 
(2002), Euro-Islam is essentially a Europeanisation of Islam in which Islamic teaching should 
be fundamentally reformed so that it is compatible with the basic principle of European 
values such as pluralism and secularism. In his conceptualisation, Euro-Islam is an effort to 
reform the interpretation of Islamic teaching through a liberal understanding and principles 
fully adopted by European society (Tibi 2008). He further argued that in order for Islamic 
teaching to be consistent with the liberal principles of European society, there are two Islamic 
principles which need to be abolish: Sharia law and Jihad (Tibi 2007). Tibi argued that these 
two concepts must be removed from Islamic teaching in Europe since these concepts do not 
conform to the basic principles of modernity such as democracy, freedom of speech and 
human rights. Through the abolishment of these principles, the Europeanisation of Islam or 
Euro-Islam can be completed (Tibi 2008). However, this does not mean that Tibi believes 
that the concept of Euro-Islam is a universal concept that should be implemented throughout 
the world. According to Tibi, Euro-Islam can only be implemented in Europe; it is a unique 
European concept in which Islam absorbs European values (Tibi 2010). 
Unlike Bassam Tibi, Tariq Ramadan has a less radical approach in constructing the idea of 
Euro-Islam. He prefers to use a synthetic approach in combining European rationality and 
Islamic teaching. According to Ramadan, there are at least two problems faced by European 
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Muslims, namely culture and identity. All of these problems continue to be a stumbling block 
for Muslims in perceiving their identity within the European community (Ramadan 2004). 
In relation to the first issue, Ramadan has a proposition that there is no religion without 
cultural expression. However, this does not mean that religion is equal to culture. The cultural 
expression of religion is sometimes indistinguishable from religion itself. Ramadan 
demonstrates his argument through the case of Muslim immigrants in Europe; first-
generation Muslims in Europe would practice Islam as they practiced in their home countries 
with different and distinct respective cultures. However, the second and third generations do 
not have a similar experience, meaning their practice of Islam is also different (Ramadan 
2009). In this context, religious culture and expression rooted from culture of origin to some 
extent influence the practice of Islam. According to Ramadan, religious culture is different to 
the teaching of Islam. Hence, it is not compulsory for second- and third-generation Muslims 
in Europe to practice Islam through the religious culture of their parents. Having creating a 
demarcation between culture and religion, Ramadan is able to build his own concept of Euro-
Islam, an Islamic teaching with a culture of religion based on European culture. 
The second issue faced by Muslim communities in Europe is identity issue. Given the 
apparent contradiction between Islamic and European identity, many second- and third-
generation Muslims in Europe find themselves split between choosing Islam or Europe as 
their identity. In order to tackle this problem, Ramadan regards identity as something other 
than monolithic; its formation does not necessarily come from the process of othering (Arfi 
2010). Thus, he contends that Islamic principles can be in line with European culture which 
emphasises modernity, rationality and tolerance (Ramadan 1999). 
Ramadan proposes three main approaches in integrating European Muslims: (1) reform in 
Islamic teaching, (2) greater social and political participation of European Muslims in the 
European public space, (3) and the promotion of intercultural dialogue and interreligious 
dialogue (Ramadan 2004). He contends that the first approach is the most important of all the 
three. The main issue for parents in Muslim families in Europe is how to teach the values of 
Islam in a secular European society to their children. Current Islamic education institutions 
have put less emphasise on the reality that Muslims live in the European context instead of in 
Muslim majority countries. It is through the educational process that values, beliefs and 
norms of Euro-Islam with its own unique European characteristics would be internalised 
among European Muslims. Thus, the need for reform of Islamic teaching in Islamic education 
institutions in Europe is the most important step to integrate European Muslims. 
In addition to the reform of Islamic teaching, greater social and political participation of 
European Muslims in European public sphere is also important in nurturing integration. 
According to Ramadan (2004), European Muslims are also less involved in the social and 
political processes in the European countries and often create a ghettoization where they tend 
to gather with fellow Muslims as if they were detached from the wider European society. 
Through a greater participation in the European public sphere, European Muslims would 
embrace the European values. Thus, in the long run, it would eradicate the feeling of 
exclusion. 
The third approach is the intercultural and interreligious dialogue. Although very elitist in 
nature, intercultural and interreligious dialogues are attempts to find common ground for 
European Muslims and broader European communities in a constructive environment in 
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order to nurture a sincere understanding of Islam. Intercultural and interreligious dialogues 
are usually conducted in the form of seminars, conferences, colloquia and meetings in which 
each religious group is represented by the religious leaders and intellectuals. Although this 
approach is important, however, the dialogues would not produce anything fruitful if the 
participants do not have direct contact with the grass root Muslims. Thus, the dialogue also 
needs to be conducted in grass root level especially the youth, the demographic group that 
experience the tension of being Muslim and at the same time European. 
Both Tibi and Ramadan’s versions of Euro-Islam have contributed significantly toward 
academic debate on integrating Muslims into European society. However, due to the radical 
nature of his model as well as his elitist approach in disseminating the idea, Tibi’s model of 
Euro-Islam has received less attention from grassroots Muslim organisations in Europe. On 
the contrary, Ramadan’s model of Euro-Islam has secured an organisational platform which 
is evident from the many Muslim organisations adopting his Euro-Islam model. As a result, 
through support from grassroots Muslim organisations, it was the Euro-Islam model proposed 
by Ramadan that finally emerged as an idea championed as a model for European Muslim. 
Furthermore, Tibi as a German academic did not involve at all in Muslim communities, even 
very critical of Muslim organisations. On the contrary, Ramadan is an intellectual Muslim 
activist, closely embedded in a certain strand of Muslim organisations across Europe. Some 
even considered him to be a part of the European branch of the Muslim Brotherhood 
(Buruma 2007; Fourest 2013). While the fact that he is the grandson of Hassan al-Banna, the 
founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, does not make him automatically linked to the 
movement, it surely helps spreading his teachings. Thus, these differences might create a 
great gap between Tibi and Ramadan with regard to their appeal to Muslim organisations in 
Europe. As a minimum, this paper finds seven differences between Bassam Tibi and Tariq 
Ramadan in conceptualising the idea of Euro-Islam as shown in Table 2. 
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The Organisational Platforms for Euro-Islam 
The support from organisational platforms is important in enhancing ideas into a broader 
public sphere. These organisational platforms will be more effective in promoting ideas at the 
transnational level if organisations have a network of communication allowing them to 
synchronise their agendas and goals. In the case of Euro-Islam, the organisational platforms 
are reflected in the emergence of Muslim transnational organisations that connect and 
synchronise the agendas of local and nationwide Muslim organisations in Europe. Through 
these organisations, Muslim communities are able to have a greater involvement in the 
European public sphere by voicing their concerns regarding the decision-making process at 
the European level. 
Indeed, the active involvement of Muslims in the European public sphere is not a new 
phenomenon (Al-Azmeh and Fokas 2007). Muslims began to enter the European public 
sphere during the 1970s marked through the opening of Islamic centres funded by many 
governments from Muslim Immigrant countries. These Islamic centres served as centres of 
Islamic culture and teaching for Muslim immigrants (Nielsen 2003). At the same time, many 
Muslim civil society organisations were established in line with ethnicity and their country of 
origin (Nielsen 2004). Their goal was mainly to provide welfare services for Muslim 
immigrants in Europe. Therefore, their activities have mainly focused on Muslim immigrants 
rather than active involvement in European civil society. 
However, with the increased awareness of European Muslim intellectuals becoming actively 
involved in shaping the European public discourse, the approach of European Muslims 
towards the government and policy makers has changed (Bowen 2004; Salih 2004). The new 
approach tends to focus more on the active participation of Muslims in the public debate than 
social activities as was the case for first-generation Muslims (Rosenow-Williams 2014a). 
This change can be attributed to the increased awareness of European Muslim civil societies, 
which see themselves as part of the European civil society in general. As a result, there are 
growing numbers of organised Muslim civil society movements that are actively involved in 
European public sphere (Pfaff and Gill 2006). 
In general, Muslim organisations in Europe have three levels of engagement, namely the 
local, national and supranational levels, in promoting and pressuring their interests. While, at 
the local and national levels, Muslim organisations operate largely on the basis of Muslim 
society interests in their respective areas, Muslim organisations operating at the European 
level tend to focus their involvement on fostering identity as European Muslims (Salvatore 
2004; Silvestri 2010). The Federation of Islamic Organisation in Europe (FIOE) is the most 
successful umbrella organisation that represents local and national Muslim organisations in 
the European level. FIOE is a home for member Muslim organisations spread across 28 
European States. It is estimated that more than 29 Muslim organisations and more than 1000 
local organisations in Europe are members of FIOE. It also establishes several institutions 
and affiliates to engage in different issues notably ranging from the issuance of fatwa to 
youth engagement (Khan 2013). 
With the emergence of this type of transnational organisation, Muslim organisations in 
Europe are traditionally interpreted not only as mosque-based, ethnic-based or national-based 
organisations but also as transnational movements that are capable of forming a pressure 
group and lobbying group for policies at the EU level representing a European Muslim 
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community. The most important function of this type of organisation is to coordinate and 
consolidate the Muslim organisations at national or local level across Europe in order to form 
transnational networks at the European level. By so doing, these organisations can increase 
the leverage of Muslim organisations to ensure their voices are heard by the policy makers at 
both national and European level. Furthermore, given their focus on fostering common 
ground between Muslim identity and European values, FIOE has become the avant-garde for 
the promotion of Euro-Islam to European Muslim and EU policy makers. 
Its efforts to implement the idea of Euro-Islam can be seen from the vision, programs and 
activities undertaken. FIOE states that the purpose of the organisation is to introduce Islamic 
values within the framework of the European culture; the organisation has tried to find a 
method for applying Islamic teaching in accordance with the values that exist in Europe 
(Rabasa et al. 2007). In discursive level, FIOE shares the same vision with the Euro-Islam 
proposed by Tariq Ramadan. FIOE seeks to promote an understanding among European 
Muslims that they are part of the broader European community (FIOE Third General 
Assembly 2012). In principle, FIEO believes that there is no fundamental difference between 
Islamic and European values. The differences are merely rooted in the prejudices and the lack 
of understanding on both side. To establish harmony between Islamic and Western 
civilisations, FIOE stressed the importance of dialogue as a bridge to link between the two 
civilisations (FIOE Fourth General Assembly 2013). Furthermore, it believes that through the 
idea of European Islam or Euro-Islam that are rooted from the European context, the full 
integration of European Muslims towards broader European society can be implemented. 
Through its rhetoric, FIOE also emphasises the importance of humanism, freedom and 
equality within Islamic teaching, which form the basic idea of the Euro-Islam norms 
(Mandaville et al. 2010). 
To further promote the idea of Euro-Islam into a public sphere, FIOE has used several 
agencies and institutions to assess and disseminate a moderate interpretation of the teachings 
of Islam which, in substance, is the elaboration of the Euro-Islam. Some of these institutions 
are the European Institute for Human Science (EIHS) and the European Council for Fatwa 
and Research (ECFR). The EIHS is a centre of Islamic education to promote understanding 
of Islam which emphasises a moderate interpretation of Islamic principles in accordance with 
European culture (Khan 2013). Through EIHS, FIOE has an instrument to spread the idea of 
Euro-Islam throughout Muslims society in Europe. EIHS itself has four separate agencies, 
each of which has a role in spreading the idea of Euro-Islam in Europe. These agencies are 
the European College for Islamic Studies, the Arabic Language Institute, the Institute for the 
training of Imams and the Institute for Learning the Holy Quran (Silvestri 2009b). 
The most important agency established by FIOE to further strengthen its authoritative claim 
as a representative of European Muslims is the European Council for Fatwa and Research 
(ECFR). The ECFR is envisioned to become the most authoritative fatwas’ producing 
institution for European Muslim communities regarding various issues and problems they 
face in everyday life (Caeiro 2011). Through the establishment of ECFR, FIOE aims to 
enhance the idea of Euro-Islam within the discourse of Islamic thought in Europe by actively 
producing and disseminating fatwas for Muslim living in Europe. Through the production 
and dissemination of fatwas, ECFR aims to both protect Muslim identity while at the same 
time integrate Muslims into European societies by providing new interpretations of Islamic 
law that fit with European context. 
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As argued by Caeiro (2010), many ECFR Muftis that are based in Europe especially those 
that affiliated with FIOE have focused more on discourses on the “integration of Muslims” 
and the fear of “Islamic radicalisation” in their formulation of fatwas. Those fatwas have 
further provided FIOE with credibility to be the moderating voice of Islam in Europe. Thus, 
fatwas from ECFR can be seen as a discursive instrument by FIOE that contribute in shaping 
European Muslims practices and behaviour. Although its fatwas give the impression of 
moderate and quite liberal approach on Islamic teaching (Caeiro 2010), the ECFR is still 
perceived by many in Europe for not having sincere efforts to come up with a moderate 
interpretation of Islam that is in line with European values. This mistrust is caused by a 
number of its council members that are seen as figures that are far from being moderates. 
Yusuf Qaradawi, one of the Islamic scholars who was highly regarded as the spiritual 
figurehead for the Muslim Brotherhood (Maréchal 2008a), has been selected as the President 
of the ECFR. 
While through the ECFR, FIOE focuses on general issues faced by Muslim communities in 
Europe, some of its leaders also established The Federation of Muslim Youth Student 
Organisation (FEMYSO) in 1996 which focuses more on empowering and disseminating 
Euro-Islam norms within Muslim youth culture. Hence, though both organisations have 
claimed of no official institutional link, FEMYSO is closely connected to the FIOE. 
Currently, FEMYSO includes 42 national and international organisations which embody the 
youth in 26 European countries. From the beginning of its establishment, FEMYSO has the 
goal of eliminating prejudices in various fields and levels on Islam and Muslims. To do so, 
FEMYSO aims to be a platform for all Muslims youth in Europe to come together, exchange 
information and share experiences with each other to share their experience as European 
Muslim. Given its characteristics as an international networks, FEMYSO is able to be more 
effective in promoting the idea of Euro-Islam especially among the youth. Through the 
networks it creates which bring together national and local affiliated organisations, FEMYSO 
also manages to be de facto representation of Muslim youth in Europe. Since 2001, FEMYSO 
has regularly provided advice to the European Commission with regard to the issues faced by 
Muslim youth in Europe (femyso.org 2014). 
There are at least two aspects that made FEMYSO be seen as an organisational platform to 
support the idea of Euro-Islam. First, FEMYSO seeks to facilitate networking among all 
young Muslims and Muslim student organisations that exist throughout Europe. Secondly, 
FEMYSO tries to contribute to fostering the idea of Euro-Islam within the European Union 
framework by actively engaging in EU plans to create religious harmony in Europe. The 
embodiments of the Tariq Ramadan version of Euro-Islam norms in FEMYSO are 
particularly apparent in the programs and activities undertaken by the organisation; FEMYSO 
focuses its activities in four major areas: the empowerment of citizens, interreligious and 
intercultural dialogue, education and training, and the development of media and 
communication to improve the process of dialogue between Muslim communities with a 
wider communities in Europe (femyso.org 2014). Given their characteristics as a federal 
organisation with an emphasis on transnational networking among Muslim youth 
organisations in Europe, FEMYSO is more effective in promoting Euro-Islam through 
uniting national organisations and existing local communities under a single common 
platform. 
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From the brief analysis above, it is evident that the idea of Euro-Islam formulated by Tariq 
Ramadan is resonated by these two Europe-wide organisations. Despite not openly stating 
their relations with Tariq Ramadan, these two organisations have strong normative relations 
with his ideas. Some founders of FIOE are Muslim activists with close ties to Ramadan. 
Furthermore, although Tariq Ramadan himself is not structurally involved in FEMYSO, he is 
considered to be a source of inspiration by FEMYSO. 
The reason for the idea of Euro-Islam formulated by Tariq Ramadan has gained support from 
FIOE and FEMYSO that is likely due to the closeness of Tariq Ramadan with Muslim 
Brotherhood. Many scholars (Maréchal 2008b; Silvestri 2009b; Vidino 2010) argued that 
FIOE and FEMYSO are a manifestation of the Muslim Brotherhood organisation in Europe. 
In fact, FIOE is considered as an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe. Indeed, 
some FIOE leaders such as Ahmed al Rawi, Ibrahim El-Zayat, Ayman Ali and Bassam 
Hatahet are members of Muslim Brotherhood. Just like FIOE, at the beginning, FEMYSO 
was founded as a platform for exchanges for various youth-oriented organisations linked to 
various Muslim organisations influenced by Muslim Brotherhood (Maréchal 2008a: p. 66). 
Thus, this loose Muslim brotherhood connection has made FEMYSO to have an ideational 
proximity with Tariq Ramadan. Given their ideational proximity with Tariq Ramadan, both 
organisations can be seen as organisational platforms that are promoting Ramadan’s version 
of Euro-Islam. 
This ideational commitment is tangible in the efforts of these two organisations to promote 
the idea of Euro-Islam in their activities and programs. FEMYSO highlights Euro-Islam to 
Muslim youth organisations in the form of programs involving intercultural and interreligious 
dialogue. The activities they conduct are also a form of ideational commitment to the idea of 
Euro-Islam. FIOE also displays this ideational commitment through institutions which are 
part of their network where they are able to disseminate and apply the idea of Euro-Islam to 
Muslim communities throughout Europe. Slightly different from the FEMYSO, the efforts 
undertaken by FIOE are much more systematic and formal. Through institutions such as the 
EIHS and the ECFR, FIOE has attempted to spread discourse about Euro-Islam among 
Muslims in Europe and broader European communities through providing a Europe context-
specific interpretation of Islamic teaching. Moreover, those two institutions are the frontline 
for disseminating Euro-Islam to European Muslim communities throughout Europe (Table 3). 
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The Role of EU in Supporting Euro-Islam 
Theoretically, when an idea has the support of organisational platforms, it will not necessarily 
be accepted by the targeted community (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). There should at least 
be critical support from the actor that has significantly promoted the development of the idea 
to be accepted by the public sphere. In the case of the emergence of the Euro-Islam, the 
critical actor who supports the existence of this idea is the European Union institutions 
particularly the European Parliament and the European Commission. The EU supports 
became the tipping point for the diffusion of the Euro-Islam; through its support, the process 
of institutionalisation can be materialised rapidly. 
The role of the EU institutions is also important in nurturing cooperation and alliances among 
Muslim organisations across Europe. In 1986, the European Parliament had (at the time) 
already provided funding for immigrant associations including the Muslim immigrants 
association (Kastoryano 2002). Since then, both European Parliament and European 
Commission have provided funds for Muslim organisations in Europe. By providing funds to 
Muslim organisations, the EU has provided significant support for the formation of an 
umbrella organisation covering Muslim organisations operating in the European Union 
member countries (Khan 2013). 
The EU also stipulates policies related to social cohesion, culture and anti-discrimination in 
favour of Muslims to integrate towards European society. In 1996, the European Parliament 
promoted the creation of Muslim Council for Cooperation in Europe (MCCE) as a 
representative body of Muslims that deal with EU institutions. Furthermore, through the 
Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA), previously called the Group of Policy Advisers 
(GOPA), the EU also facilitates the participation of citizens and organisations representing 
religious communities in policy making through consultation mechanisms (Silvestri 2009a). 
These mechanisms provide accountability in policy making in which lobby groups and 
Muslim organisations can play their part to enhance their agendas. 
While the support of states within the EU is also important in fostering the idea of Euro-
Islam, EU support as a supranational institution has a greater impact on the development of 
Euro-Islam. This is due to the limited resources of local and nationwide Muslim organisations 
to conduct advocacy, as well as several national laws within EU countries that limit how 
states interact with religious groups (Warner and Wenner 2006). On the contrary, the EU 
institutions are more accommodating to the efforts to develop idea that can integrate Muslim 
communities into European society (Koenig 2007). By advocating at the EU level, Muslim 
organisations in Europe also have to work together and establish solidarity among local and 
nationwide Muslim organisations within the European Union countries. More extensive 
interaction between Muslim organisations in Europe with the EU institutions has created an 
awareness among Muslim organisations regarding the importance of forming a cross-country 
transnational network to be able to negotiate and lobby at the EU level (Rosenow 2009). This 
has resulted in the formation of a transnational network among Muslim organisations in 
Europe that share a common platform and agenda. The greater importance of FIOE and 
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FEMYSO in organising the voice of Muslim organisations in Europe can be attributed to this 
greater awareness regarding the importance of EU level advocacy. 
Furthermore, by taking the promotion of Euro-Islam as their main agenda, Muslim umbrella 
organisations such as FIOE and FEMYSO have attained a greater leverage when it comes to 
lobbying in the European level. In responding to the London and Madrid bombings in 2004 
and 2005, respectively, the European Commission has begun to tackle radical Islam and 
nurture the idea of European Islam, which could enable European Muslims to be considered 
as fully embraced European values (Yildiz and Verkuyten 2012). The EU policies in 
integrating Muslims into European society have become more frequent, especially in building 
interfaith and intercivilisation dialogue (Silvestri 2005). This shows that after the Madrid and 
London Bombing, Islam has become a constantly important focus for the EU. The surge in 
EU policies concerning Muslim-related issues are part of a pragmatic response to home-
grown radicalisation in Europe. 
As a part of an effort to fight home-grown radicalisation, under the presidency of José 
Manuel Barroso (2004–2014), the European Commission sought to establish good relations 
with Muslim organisations especially those that can be regarded as a representative of 
European Muslims. This initiative has provided umbrella organisation such as FIOE and 
FEMYSO, as the most consolidated umbrella organisations, an opportunity to become main 
interlocutors with the EU. Thus, since 2004, European Parliament and European Commission 
are keen to support the idea of Euro-Islam as a strategy to counter radicalisation of European 
Muslims. 
As discussed above, the interaction between European Muslim organisations at the EU level 
as well as the greater support from the EU for the creation of a network of Muslim 
organisations in Europe has had a positive impact on the development of Euro-Islam in 
European Muslim communities. Firstly, by helping nurture the establishment of a network of 
Muslim organisation in Europe, the EU has made it possible for Euro-Islam to have 
organisational platforms in the EU level. Secondly, the EU provides a Europe-wide playing 
field for these organisational platforms to advocate and socialise Euro-Islam. This has made 
Muslim umbrella organisations at the European level such as FIOE and FEMYSO to act as 
agents of socialisation for Euro-Islam through lobbying and advocacy to the EU institutions 
as targeted actors. 
 
The Institutionalisation of Euro-Islam? 
In January 2008, the Muslims of Europe Charter was signed by more than 400 organisations 
from 28 European countries. The charter, sponsored by FIOE, reflects the codification of 
Euro-Islam into one single document. The purpose of the signing of the charter was to 
elaborate on the position of Muslims in Europe. In the preamble, it is stated that the charter is 
trying to find a common ground between Islamic and European values that can be upheld 
over the differences between the two. This charter clearly says that the values of human rights 
and freedom are an integral part of the values shared by European Muslims, which constitute 
the core values of Euro-Islam. The charter can be treated as a written document regarding the 
institutionalisation of Euro-Islam. 
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The Vice-President of the European Parliament at the time, Mario Mauro, responded 
positively to the charter signatories; he believed that the charter is a commitment from 
Muslims to help the governments of countries in Europe in creating a harmonious and 
prosperous society and demonstrates their commitment as citizens of Europe to play a role in 
justice, equality and respect for differences (Küchler and Philips 2008). However, his 
statement could not be seen as EU support toward this Charter project. After the occurrence 
of terrorist attacks carried out by radical Islamic groups in Europe, European Union was 
trying to combat radicalisation among European Muslims. Thus, his support to the idea was a 
part of EU broader strategy to conduct de-radicalisation among Muslim communities in 
Europe by engaging Muslim communities (Table 4). 
 
 
The signing of the Muslims of Europe Charter by more than 400 Muslim organisations from 
all European countries can be seen as an inclination by majority European Muslim 
Organisations to the idea of Euro-Islam. The signing of this charter in 2008 might be 
interpreted as a moment in which the Euro-Islam was already accepted by majority of 
European Muslim Organisations. Nevertheless, despite the seemingly overwhelming support 
from Muslim organisations in Europe, the signing of the charter is by no means the 
acceptance of Euro-Islam among Muslim societies in Europe. Though there have been efforts 
to internalise the Euro-Islam among Muslims in Europe, Euro-Islam has not yet become a 
stable set of values let alone an norm embraced by the majority of European Muslims. On the 
one hand, there are still many major Muslim organisations that are reluctant with the idea of 
Euro-Islam as well as radical groups that do not want to compromise by accepting European 
values. On the other hand, for right-wing groups within European society, there is suspicion 
regarding the idea of Euro-Islam as a camouflage for a perceived Islamisation agenda within 
Europe. 
Some of the criticism has been directed at organisational platforms for Euro-Islam. Umbrella 
organisations such as FIOE are criticised for not representing the Islamic communities in 
Europe; they have propounded Euro-Islam merely as an elitist discourse. At the grassroots 
level, this idea is far from being diffused and ingrained. As argued by several scholars 
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(Amghar et al. 2007; Silvestri 2010), Euro-Islam is not diffused in grassroots Muslim 
communities because of the fact that it is only embraced by some Muslim umbrella 
organisations which arguably could not be treated as organisations that fully represent all 
European Muslim communities. Moreover, some of the criticism has been directed at Tariq 
Ramadan, the intellect behind the Euro-Islam. The criticism against Ramadan is not directed 
to his thinking, rather to his personality. Ramadan was accused of conducting double 
discourse by conveying different messages to the European public and to the Muslim 
community. He was accused of sounding extremely moderate and liberal in the European 
public while at the same time propagating Islamism among the Muslim youth (Vidino 2005). 
Another issue that makes Euro-Islam is perceived negatively is the lack of infrastructure for 
the development of Euro-Islam at the grassroots level (Warner and Wenner 2006). As we 
know, Islam particularly Sunni Islam, as the largest denomination of Islam, is a religion that 
has no hierarchy of clerical and religious institutions like the Catholic Church. The absence 
of this clerical infrastructure hinders the immediate institutionalisation and socialisation of 
Euro-Islam in grassroots Muslim community. As a result, there are many mosques and 
organisations that do not spread the understanding of Euro-Islam. Furthermore, many major 
ethnic-based Muslim organisations such as Millî Görüş and Gülen movement are not part of 
organisational platforms that advocate Euro-Islam and even rejected the idea of Euro-Islam. 
These two Muslim organisations do not find the idea of Euro-Islam important as an 
alternative idea to reconcile Islam and European values. Rather, these two organisations opt 
to develop their own societal acceptable position by creating a distinction between religion 
and culture as two types of belief systems (Yildiz and Verkuyten 2012). Thus, although 
transnational Muslim organisation such as FIOE becomes an institution that is widely 
considered as one of the best option as partner to represent European Muslims by the EU, in 
reality, it is far from representing the majority of European Muslims. Moreover, despite 
having an objective to provide an alternative model of Islam that is more compatible with 
European values, Euro-Islam has been perceived sceptically and suspiciously by scholars and 
policy makers in Europe. This is due to the close relations of organisational platforms 
promoting this idea with the Islamist group, Muslim Brotherhood. 
It is not surprising that many pundits find that the idea of Euro-Islam is nothing but a 
doublespeak practiced by Islamists in order to survive in European multicultural space 
(Maréchal 2008b; Rubin 2010; Vidino 2010). Given all the limitations, thus, at this stage, 
Euro-Islam can be seen as an empty signifier that are open to continual contestation which 
provides European-wide Muslim organisations that are related with Muslim Brotherhood 
with speaker position to lobby at European level. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper suggests that Euro-Islam has been in a socialisation stage characterised by the 
presence of norm entrepreneurs that highlight the idea of Euro-Islam at the discourse level 
among European Muslim communities in particular and European society in general. Without 
the presence of norm entrepreneurs, the idea of Euro-Islam would not be captured by 
organisational platforms that can further promote the idea. In the discursive stage, Euro-Islam 
is still contested with the presence of two strands of Euro-Islam conceptualisation proposed 
by Bassam Tibi and Tariq Ramadan. However, due to the more moderate approach proposed 
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by Ramadan, the Euro-Islam version proposed by Ramadan has resonated with several 
Muslim umbrella organisation. FIOE and FEMYSO are instances of organisation that and 
serve as organisational platforms for Euro-Islam. 
However, organisational platforms are not solely promoted to the idea without any interest. 
Our findings suggest that the idea can be strategically used by the organisational platforms to 
enhance their position. In the case of Euro-Islam, organisational platforms such as FIOE and 
FEMYSO can enhance their position as a representative of European Muslims by engaging 
with the discourse. The same can be said for the EU as a targeted actor without which the 
idea of Euro-Islam would not have a substantive support. Though the EU support for Euro-
Islam has been critical in further enhancing the idea through providing a platform for Muslim 
organisations at the European level, its support is motivated by the pragmatic goal of 
reducing the prevalence of extremist ideology among Muslim communities in Europe. 
Overall, despite having been promoted by Europe-wide organisational platforms and 
supported by the EU institutions, the idea of Euro-Islam is still far from being widely 
accepted within the European public sphere. This paper shows that Euro-Islam not only has 
been challenged by Muslim communities in Europe but also has been negatively perceived by 
European audiences. These conditions have hindered further socialisation of the Euro-Islam 
into European Muslims communities. 
Given the increasing threat of home-grown radicalisation in Europe, there is a need to further 
implement the Euro-Islam as a modern interpretation of Islam in the European context as a 
solution for the Muslim conundrum in Europe. The issue that needs to be addressed is 
twofold. First, the organisational platforms for Euro-Islam should be expanded which include 
not only organisations that are closely related with moderate Islamists but also other 
organisations that may not have a tie to Islamist movement. Second, rather than frame its 
engagement with Muslim issues mainly as a security matter, the EU should play a more 
important and sincere role in nurturing the idea of Euro-Islam as a way to integrate its 
growing Muslim population towards broader European societies. Without tackling these two 
issues, the Euro-Islam could ultimately become a failed proposed solution due to the lack of 
acceptance from both the European Muslim communities as well as European society in 
general. 
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